goal-seeking activities. Driesch's neglect to recognize and to develop this aspect of the functions of entelechy remains a defect or weakness of his whole theory, although not perhaps an irremediable one. For we cannot remain content, like some of the older vitalists, merely to attribute to entelechy a *vis directrix* working in the void. That which directs and arranges the material processes of morphogenesis (if it is to be an effective agent in holding morphogenesis true to the pattern of the species and in restoring it to the normal course after forced divergence from it) must *in some sense* contain or carry within itself the pattern of the species, even though it work, in part, on the principle of epigenesis rather than on the principle of pre-formation. If, finding ourselves driven by the evidences of teleological direction of bodily functions, such as morphogenesis, to postulate a non-physical factor as playing an essential role in living things, and if, like Driesch (in his earlier writings, at least) we deny it the leading role in the psychical or mental functions in the narrow sense (i. e., the conscious activities), we shall have to postulate a non-physical factor of a different order to account for these. And this would be a gross offence against the principle of economy of hypothesis. The more so since the functions assigned to the two kinds of entelechy are very similar in all essential respects, except that in the one case they are unconscious or subconscious, and in the other conscious. In both cases the essential functions are two, namely, the steering of

the vital processes towards some prescribed goal and the bringing to bear, upon the execution of this directive or adaptive task, of experience gained in the past. Without going so far as some modern authors who, greatly impressed by the evidences of a wealth of subconscious activities in